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Abstract
The objectives of this study are to investigate the institutional speci¯cs of
sequential cattle auctions and their role as determinants of prices. Institutional
speci¯cs are the order of sale according to quality, a secret reserve price, bidders'
multi-unit demand and di®erent types of bidders. Prices decline and bidders with
a higher demand pay on average lower prices. The estimation results show that
declining prices are caused by the order of sale according to quality and the secret
reserve price. The results further show that bidders take the strategic e®ect of
sequential auctions and multi-unit demand into account.
JEL Classi¯cations: D44, Q12
Keywords: Sequential auctions, private values, bidding behavior, applied economet-
rics1 Introduction
Standard models of auctions predict constant prices when identical units of a good are
sequentially o®ered to bidders who demand at last one unit (Milgrom and Weber 2000, and
Weber 1983). In reality, we often observe di®erent price patterns, but also conditions that
do not completely ful¯ll the assumptions of these models.1;2 If bidders demand more than
one unit, we expect bidders to shade their bids for earlier units and prices to increase
over an auction day (Donald, Paarsch and Robert 2006). Reasons for declining prices
might be the order of sale according to product quality (Beggs and Graddy 1997), supply
uncertainty (Jeitschko 1999) or participation cost (von der Fehr 1994).
This is an empirical study of bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions.3 The
objectives are to analyze the institutional speci¯cs and their role as determinants of prices.
Institutional speci¯cs are the order of sale according to quality, a secret reserve price,
bidders' multi-unit demand and di®erent types of bidders. In Amstetten, a smaller city
in Austria, dairy cows of di®erent quality are o®ered in a sequence of ascending auctions.
Every cow is o®ered by a di®erent seller, who may reject the outcome of the auction
immediately after the price has been hammered down by the auctioneer. Bidders are
either representatives of wholesale ¯rms, i.e. traders, or farmers from nearby regions. We
observe two notable price patterns. Prices decline over auction days and traders pay on
average lower prices than farmers.
1Examples for declining prices are wine auctions (Ashenfelter 1989), art auctions (Beggs and Graddy
1997), or rose auctions (van den Berg, van Ours and Pradhan 2001). Examples for increasing prices
are rare book auctions (Deltas and Kosmopoulou, 2004). There are also other patterns like an inverse
U-shaped pattern. An example are auctions of eggplants in France (La®ont, Loisel and Vuong 1997).
2More recent theoretical papers point out a number of con°icting e®ects that determine the outcome
of expected prices. Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2004) provide a detailed list under which assumptions
prices decrease, stay constant or increase. A discussion of sequential auctions in more detail is given in
Krishna (2002).
3For surveys on empirical studies about auctions see Hendricks and Paarsch (1995) or La®ont (1997).
For a survey on nonparametric identi¯cation and estimation of auction models see Athey and Haile (2005).
1The addressed questions are, whether the decline in prices is caused by the order
of sale according to quality or the secret reserve price that is equivalent to supply un-
certainty. I further investigate, whether bidders consider the strategic e®ects generated
by the sequential auctions and multi-unit demand, and whether the price di®erence be-
tween traders and farmers is caused by di®erences in bidders' preferences or di®erences in
strategic behavior. Finally, I assess the relative contribution of the institutional speci¯cs
explaining the price decline over auction days and the price di®erence between traders
and farmers.
To answer these questions, I discuss various bidding models that take the institutional
speci¯cs into account and describe the predictions of these models on prices. In particular,
I describe the predictions of strategic variables like bidders' demand and the probability
that the seller rejects the outcome of the auction. To test the predictions, I estimate
hedonic price equations with ordinary least squares.4 I further employ decomposition
techniques known from labor economics to measure the relative importance of bidders'
preferences, strategic behavior and the institutional speci¯cs. I utilize a large data set
on cattle auctions that covers 95 auction days from 1995 till 2003 with more than 25,000
dairy cows o®ered.
As all important characteristics of the auctioned cows are exposed in a catalogue, I
discuss the bidding models within the independent private value paradigm.5 The main
characteristics of a dairy cow is the amount of milk it can produce and a categorization
into quality classes provides this information. Sellers have to guarantee on this. The milk
price is known, and thus the value of a cow. Bidders also tend to agree on the various
characteristics of the animals in cattle auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1999).
As a consequence bidders' preferences can be assumed to be purely of private nature.
4For a detailed analysis on the estimation of auctions with ordinary least squares see Rezende (2005).
5For an analysis whether a private or a common value model ¯ts best the data see Paarsch (1992).
2Every bidder ranks the di®erent characteristics in another order depending on breeding
program goals.
The second group of bidders are traders. They are agents of resale ¯rms and buy
cattle on behalf of their ¯rms, but also on behalf of farmers who do not attend the auction,
but who have placed orders for a particular animal(s) at speci¯c prices before the opening
of the market. These prices are then the valuations of the traders in the auction (La®ont,
Ossard and Vuong, 1995). If traders only bid on behalf of their ¯rms, their valuations
are subject to demand in the resale market which may be correlated with demand in the
current auction market. However, ¯rms buy for geographically distinct markets which I
assume to be independent.6
In ascending auctions with private values, it is a dominant strategy to \stay in"
the auction as long as the price is lower than one's own valuation (Vickrey 1961). This
also true for sequential ascending auctions (Milgrom and Weber 2000). The optimal
stopping rule determines the price of each unit and we expect constant prices. If bidders
demand more than one unit, bidders shade their bids for earlier units and we expect
increasing prices (Donald, Paarsch and Roberts 2006). Prices further depend on bidders'
own demand and other bidders' demand (Vickrey 1961, and Ausubel 2004). If the seller
may reject the outcome of the auction, rational bidders adjust their strategic behavior
to in°uence the probability that the seller rejects the outcome of the auction and guard
themselves against a lower probability to win by bidding more aggressively for earlier
units. By adjusting the model of Jeitschko (1999), I show that prices decline over an
auction day and depend on the probability of rejection.7
6Haile (2001) provides an analysis of timber auctions, where ¯rms bid for harvesting contracts in U.S.
forests and have the opportunity to later resale their contracts.
7For an empirical analysis of a secret reserve price in static ascending auctions see EklÄ of and Lunander
(2003) and for an empirical analysis of a secret reserve price in static ¯rst-price auctions see Elyakime,
La®ont, Ossard and Voung (1994).
3The contribution of this paper is to consider multi-unit demand and a secret reserve
price in sequential auctions and disentangle their opposite e®ects on prices. The contri-
bution of it is, however, not a structural bidding model that already assumes optimal
behavior, but to provide empirical evidence on bidders' behavior in sequential auctions.
Similar papers are for example, Beggs and Graddy (1997), who analyze the order of sale
in art auctions. They show that prices decline relative to a cost estimate when products
are sorted according to their quality and the one with the highest quality is auctioned
o® ¯rst, and they provide empirical evidence for that e®ect. Deltas and Kosmopoulou
(2004), in turn, use rare book auctions with °oor and mail-in bidders as a natural experi-
ment to distinguish between `catalogue' and `order-of-sale' e®ects. They ¯nd that bidding
patterns are driven by non-strategic factors like the print order of lots in the catalogue.
An example for a structural model is Donald, Paarsch and Robert (2006). They
analyze a sample of sequential, ascending, open-exit auctions of Siberian timber export-
permits within the independent private value paradigm. They allow participants to desire
more than one object and construct a theoretical model of participation and bidding. They
estimate the participation process and underlying distribution of bidders' valuations with
a structural simulation estimator based on the one proposed by La®ont, Ossard and Vuong
(1995).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the auction
market in Amstetten, the data and summary statistics. Section 3 discusses the sequential
bidding process and its predictions on prices. Section 4 presents the empirical bidding
model and construction of variables. Section 5 gives estimation and decomposition results.
Section 6 concludes.
42 Cattle auctions in Amstetten, Austria
In this section I give a detailed description of Austrian cattle auctions. I also describe the
data and provide summary statistics.
2.1 Description of the market
Cattle auctions in Amstetten8 are conducted as ascending, closed-exit auctions. During
a typical auction day 200-300 animals are sold. These are o®ered sequentially. The cattle
auctioned are dairy cows and stock bulls. The second group is rather a complement to
the former and will therefore not be investigated within this paper.
Auctions take place eleven times a year and each one lasts for two days. On the
¯rst day potential buyers have the opportunity to view the animals and a catalogue with
a detailed description of every animal is available at a low price. In recent times this
catalogue can also be downloaded from the organization's web page about two weeks
before the market takes place. The description of the cattle includes various quality
criteria such as milk production, milk components, the owner of the animal, its date of
birth, names of parents and grandparents as well as some of the quality criteria of the
parents and grandparents. The cattle are divided into three categories, namely \young
female calves", \female calves" and \cows". The main di®erence between these three
categories is the age of the cattle.9 There are two di®erent breeds, Fleckvieh, animals with
a spotted coat, and Braunvieh, animals with a brown coat. The cattle are characterized
by two quality criteria. The ¯rst criterion has six di®erent classi¯cations. For cows and
female calves it gives the minimum requirements for the output and structure (fat, protein)
of their milk. In the case of young female calves it gives the minimum requirements for
their mother's milk. Cattle of the highest classi¯cation were not sold on one of the auction
8Amstetten is a small city in Lower Austria, a federal state in Austria.
9The label \calves" is slightly misleading as these animals have already given birth.
5days. The second quality criterion has three classi¯cations and it is a subclass of the other
quality criterion.
Medical checks are carried out during the animals' stay in the auction stables and
the results are published on the morning of the second day, when the auctions take place.
Female calves and cows are also milked in the evening of the ¯rst day and in the morning
of the second day. These results are published as well.10 On the second day the animals
are auctioned. The order of sale is sorted according to breed, category and the two quality
criteria. Within each group the order is random.
The auctioneer starts the auction at a ¯xed price and raises the price by ¯xed
amounts. The bidders have so-called \Winkers". These are paddles with a number on
their front. Everyone who wants to bid has to pay a small fee for such a \Winker". With
these, the bidders can bid for a particular animal. They raise and drop the paddle to
indicate that they accept the announced price.11 The auction lasts until no one is willing
to accept the next highest bid. When the bidding stops, the animal for sale is hammered
down, but not necessarily sold as the seller has the possibility to reject the price. During
the auction the respective seller represents the animal in front of the bidders. If nobody
is willing to accept the starting price the auctioneer lowers the price as in a descending
(Dutch) auction until someone accepts it. From there on, the auctioneer again starts
to raise the price by the same ¯xed amount as before and the procedure continues as
described above.
In this market, sellers are farmers and buyers are representatives of wholesale ¯rms,
i.e. traders, or farmers from nearby regions. Traders regularly attend and bid in auctions.
10If the milking output does not coincide with the information provided by the seller, the auction house
depreciates the quality of the cattle to the lowest quality and announces that before the auctions take
place. Thus, it is in the very interest of the sellers to correctly report the cattle's quality.
11When bulls are auctioned, bidders sometimes also outcry their bids. I did not observe this phe-
nomenon when dairy cows were auctioned. Avery (1998) showed that in the case of jump bidding the
equilibrium bids change. This is another reason why I do not consider bulls in the empirical analysis.
6Farmers may also regularly attend auctions, but due their lower demand do not bid that
often. This may create a di®erence in experience. All bidders arrive at the auction place
with trucks to transport the cattle afterwards. As the cattle has to be brought away from
the market place within the next day, the size of these trucks determines bidders' capacity
on an auction day. Some of the traders even use truck tractors, whereas farmers usually
use small tumbrils. The trucks are parked in front of the auction hall and are thus visible
for all. Bidders' overall capacities depend, of course, more likely on the size of their ¯rms
or their farms. The animals, however, have to be removed from the auction stable within
one day. Besides, some cattle produce milk and need daily care. Thus, bidders' capacity
on an auction day is determined by their trucks. Furthermore, traders tend to bid for
pregnant cows only, as lactating cows cannot be transported long distances.
2.2 Data and summary statistics
The data, which were kindly provided by \NOE Genetik", cover 95 auction days from
1995 till 2003. For each animal the winning bid, breed, category, two quality criteria,
weight, date of the auction, (anonymous) identity of the seller, and (anonymous) identity
of the winning bidder (the number of the \Winker") are known. The identity of the sellers
can be traced across auction days, those of the bidders only within auction days. However,
some of the regular bidders always obtain a \Winker" with a particular number. The data
also include the outcome of each auction. It may one of the following four cases, \sold
in the auction", \sold after the auction", \the seller does not accept the price obtained
in the auction" and \no bidder is willing to accept the initial price". Only few objects
were sold after the auction and not during the auction. Usually, in these cases the seller
had an outside o®er which he or she accepted. These deals also go through the auction
house as every seller commits himself or herself to report any sale of a registered animal.
Finally, for each auction day the order of sale is known.
7Table 1 presents summary statistics. From 1995 till 2003, 27183 cows were registered
for sale; 25125 (92%) cows were sold, for 1497 (6%) cows the seller rejected the outcome of
the auction and for 561 (2%) cows the initial o®er was not accepted. The average winning
bid of all registered objects was Euro 1275.12 For the cases when the seller did not accept
the o®er or there was no initial o®er, the winning bid is equal to the last submitted o®er.
The average winning bid of those cows that were sold in the auction was equal to Euro
1296, that of those cows that were sold after the auction was equal to Euro 1381. There
was variation in the mean winning bids across various subgroups like breed, category or
quality. The two most often o®ered product groups are Fleckvieh, female calves of quality
2B and Fleckvieh, female calves of quality 3A. They amount for 66% and 16% of the
overall sample.
Table 1 about here
Within an auction day, bidders can be identi¯ed by the number of their \Winker".
With the help of this variable I de¯ne two groups of bidders. As representatives of
wholesale ¯rms usually get a \Winker" number ending with a zero like 10, 20, and so on,
these bidders are de¯ned as traders. The other bidders are de¯ned as farmers. In contrast
to the group of sellers it is not possible to follow di®erent bidders across auctions days.
The average winning bids of the two bidder groups di®er. The mean price of traders
equals Euro 1197, that of farmers Euro 1352, a price di®erence of roughly 12%. One
reason for this di®erence could be that these two groups bid for cattle of di®erent quality,
another that the bidding behavior is di®erent across bidders.
To investigate how prices evolve over an auction day, I divide each auction day
into ten intervals and we observe that the mean price decreases from Euro 1263 in the
morning to Euro 1054 in the afternoon, a price di®erence of roughly 17%. Actually, we
12Prices are constant as of 1996. Prices before the introduction of the Euro are divided by 13.7603
which denotes the reference value for the Austrian Schilling in the Euro currency board.
8¯rst observe increasing and then decreasing prices, which can be explained by the order of
sale according to breed, category and the two quality criteria. I therefore also calculated
the price di®erence over an auction day within particular product groups (same breed,
same category and same qualities). Here, I observe monotone price declines of about
20% depending on the product group. Then I calculated the price decline of traders' and
farmers' prices. The ¯rst is equal to 5%, whereas the later is of about 22%.
Table 2 presents bidders' demand schedules. Most of the cattle were sold to bidders
who bought one or two animals. Within this group most buyers were farmers. Generally,
we notice a large di®erence between traders and farmers, not only with respect to their
demand, but also with respect to the prices they pay. The majority of traders buys
between 11 and 40 cattle per auction day. They pay lower prices and prices are (relatively)
constant. The majority of farmers buys one cattle and those, who buy a second one, pay
a lower price for that.
Table 2 about here
The descriptive statistics show a falling price sequence. It may be caused by the order
of sale according to observed product characteristics or by bidders' strategic behavior.
The descriptive statistics further show that bidders demand not only one unit and that
sellers' rate to reject the outcome of the auction is not negligible. The next section studies
bidders' strategic behavior taking into account the results of the descriptive analysis.
3 Theoretical considerations
This section outlines the sequential bidding process on which the empirical bidding model
is build. I ¯rst describe bidders' demand and their valuations. I then describe bidders'
strategic behavior when they demand one unit, when they demand more than one unit,
and when there is a secret reserve price available to sellers who may reject the outcome
9of the auction.
3.1 Bidders' demand and valuations
There is a sequence of ascending auctions.13 Assume there are l = 1;:::;L units for sale
and i = 1;:::;I risk neutral bidders who demand at least one unit. Let di be bidder
i's capacity on an auction day. It is determined by the size of bidder i's truck and
thus determines bidder i's demand on an auction day. Total demand is denoted by D
and is equal to the sum of the demand of all bidders, i.e. D =
PI
i=1 di. The values di
are independent draws from a continuous probability distribution F with the associated
density function f. Let vil be bidder i's valuation for the l-th unit. Bidder i's valuation vil




¯zl + °i(ui;qil) if qil · di
0 otherwise
; (1)
where ¯ is a coe±cient to be estimated. Bidder i's demand schedule °i is a function of
bidder i's private valuation ui and the number of units qil bidder i has bought until l.
Bidder i's valuation depends on the number of bought units qil as long as it is smaller
than bidder i's demand di. Otherwise bidder i's valuation is equal to zero. The values ui
are independent draws from a continuous probability distribution G with the associated
density function g.
13There are some forms of ascending auctions. Milgrom and Weber (1982, 2000) describe button (clock,
Japanese) auctions when they analyze this format. There, the price raises continuously and bidders press
a button as long as they wish to stay in the auction. Once they have left the auction, they have to stay
out. These auctions are also called open-exit auctions, as the exit of one bidder can be observed by other
bidders. The auctions in Amstetten are ascending, closed-exit auctions with a ¯xed step size announced
by the auctioneer. The bidders use their \Winkers" to indicate their willingness to accept an announced
o®er. If they wish to do so, they raise their \Winker". Afterwards they put it down. Thus, one cannot
perfectly observe whether other bidders have already left the auction or are still participating. However,
I assume that the button auction is a su±cient model of the auctions in Amstetten.
10Without specifying the optimal behavior of bidders and sellers, the winning bid bwl
can be expressed as a function of product characteristics and a function awl that measures
all game theoretic relevant components, such that
bwl = ¯zl + awl; (2)
where the subscript w denotes the winning bidder. In the following, I describe the func-
tional form of awl for some special cases.
3.2 One-unit demand
With independent private values, the outcome of an one-unit ascending auction is equiv-
alent to the outcome of an one-unit second-price sealed bid auction. In the latter, bidders
submit sealed bids to a seller. As Vickrey (1961) shows the dominant strategy for each
bidder in the one-unit second-price auction is to bid one's own valuation regardless of the
other bidders' valuations, i.e. bopt = ¯zl + ui. In the ascending auction, the dominant
strategy is to bid up to one's own valuation. This result does not depend on the symmetry
of bidders' valuations or risk aversion. The highest bid wins, but the price is only equal
to the second highest bid. If there is a sequence of independent one-unit auctions , the
function awl is equal to
awl = u[2:I] 8l; (3)
where u[2:I] denotes the second-order statistic of the distribution G.
If there is more than one unit and bidders demand only one unit, Milgrom and Weber
(2000) show that the optimal strategy in a sequence of ascending auctions is also to bid
up to one's own valuation for each object, i.e. bopt = ¯zl + ui. An optimal stopping rule
determines the price of each unit. The L bidders with the L-th highest valuations are
going to obtain one unit. In the ¯rst auction, they stay in the auction till the bidder with
the L+1-th highest valuation has left. The remaining L bidders leave simultaneously and
11the unit is assigned to the bidder with the highest valuation at a price equal to the value
of the L + 1 highest bidder. In the next auction, there is one bidder less and one object
less for sale. The L ¡ 1 bidders with the L ¡ 1-th highest valuations are going to obtain
one unit. They stay in the auction till the bidder with the L+1-th highest valuation has
left. The remaining L ¡ 1 bidders leave simultaneously and the unit is assigned to the
bidder with the second highest valuation at a price equal to the value of the L+1 highest
bidder. This procedure is applied until the last unit. The function awl is then equal to
awl = u[L+1:I] 8l; (4)
where u[L+1:I] denotes the L + 1-th order statistic of the distribution function G. Prices
are expected to be constant over an auction day and to depend negatively on L. The
more units L are o®ered on an auction day, the lower the price.
3.3 Multi-unit demand
If bidders demand more than one unit, Donald, Paarsch and Roberts (2006) show that
expected prices increase. In general, there are multiple equilibria and there might be even
no closed form solution for awl. To still illustrate such a case, I describe the generalized
Vickrey auction with L units, where bidders are assumed to bid demand schedules. In a
generalized Vickrey auction, the auctioneer sorts all the submitted demand schedules and
allocates the L units to the L-th highest bids at prices equal to the bids of the highest
losing bidders. A bidder who wins qwL units on an auction day pays the qwL highest losing
bids of the other bidders.14 The optimal strategy in the generalized Vickrey auction is to
bid one's own demand schedule, bopt = ¯zl + °i(ui;qil). For this auction, the function awl
is equal to
awl = °¡w(u[L+qwL¡qwl:D];q¡wl); (5)
14See for example, Krishna (2002) or Paarsch and Hong (2006).
12where °¡w is the residual supply that each winning bidder w is facing, i.e. the aggregated
demand schedule of all other bidders. Prices depend on the arguments of °¡w. These are
the valuations u[L+qwL¡qwl:D] of the highest losing bids (out of D positive valuations) and
the demand q¡wl of other bidders, where qwL is the total number of units bought by the
winning bidder on an auction day, qwl is the cumulative number of units bought by the
winning bidder on an auction day.
Prices are expected to depend positively on qwL and qwl and negatively on L and
q¡wl. The more units the winning bidder qwL demands, the higher the price. Winning
bidders pay the lowest price for their ¯rst unit and the highest price for their last unit
or equivalently, they shade their bids for earlier units. Prices are therefore expected to
increase with the cumulative number of units bought by the winning bidder qwl. According
to standard arguments, we expect that the more units L are o®ered on an auction day,
the lower the price. The function °¡w is decreasing in q¡wl and we therefore also expect
prices to decrease with the cumulative number of units bought by other bidders q¡wl.
3.4 Sellers' valuations and a secret reserve price
In Amstetten, a seller may reject the outcome of an auction. Although some sellers o®er
more than one unit, I assume for simplicity that there are L sellers each of them o®ering
one unit. Let rl be seller l's valuation of the l-th unit and let it be an independent draw
from a continuous probability distribution H with the associated density function h. In
contrast to bidders, each seller faces a static decision problem.
Seller l optimally rejects the outcome of the l-th auction, i.e. the adjusted winning
bid awl, if awl is lower than his valuation rl, and accepts the outcome of the auction, if
awl is equal or higher than his valuation rl. The possibility to reject the outcome of the
auction e®ects the number of o®ered units and adds uncertainty to total supply. Rational
bidders are aware of this. If they leave the auction too early { compared to a model
13without a secret reserve price, sellers with a high valuation will reject the outcome of the
auction and fewer units will be available. Bidders therefore adjust their strategic behavior
to in°uence the probability of rejection.
The sequence of winning bids changes due to the change in bidders' optimal behavior.
If we assume that there are two units for sale and bidders demand only one unit, bidder
i's optimal strategy in the second auction is to bid up to her valuation ui. Her expected
pro¯t ¼2 in the second auction is equal to
¼2(ui) = ui ¡ ½2f½1E[u[3]jui = u[2]] + (1 ¡ ½1)E[u[2]jui = u[1]]g; (6)
where ½l is the probability that the outcome of the l-th auction is not rejected, i.e. ½l =
Prob(rl < awl). Bidder i's pro¯t in the second auction is equal to bidder i's valuation
ui minus the price paid in the second auction given that second unit is sold. This price
is a weighted average of the third-order statistic and the second-order statistic with the
weight to be the probability that the ¯rst unit is sold, ½1.
Bidder i's optimal strategy in the ¯rst auction is to bid her valuation ui minus the
expected payo® in the second auction (6):
b1(ui) = ui ¡ ¼2(ui) = (1 ¡ ½2)ui + ½2f½1E[u[3]jui = u[2]] + (1 ¡ ½1)E[u[2]jui = u[1]]g: (7)
To guard themselves against a lower probability to win, bidders react by bidding more
aggressively. They bid a weighted average of their valuation ui and the price in the second
auction, i.e. ½1E[u[3]jui = u[2]] + (1 ¡ ½1)E[u[2]jui = u[1]]. The higher the probabilities
of rejection, the more aggressive bidders bid, as otherwise some of the bidders do not
obtain a unit although their valuation is higher than the valuation of the seller. If the
probabilities of rejection are very large, bidders stay in the ¯rst auction even until the
bidder with the second highest valuation has left.15
15Jeitschko (1999) formally describes the equilibrium price paths of a model that also comes close to
the situation in Amstetten. In his model, there are two units for sale and with some probability ½ there
14If the outcome of the ¯rst auction and the second auction are not rejected by the
respective sellers and both units are sold, we can show that the price of the second unit
is expected to be lower than the price of the ¯rst unit, i.e. E[P2jp1] < p1. The proof is




(1 ¡ ½2½1)u[2:I] + ½2½1u[3:I] if l=1
u[3:I] if l=2 ; (8)
where the price in the ¯rst auction is equal to a weighted average of the second and
the third order statistic. Prices are expected to decline and to depend positively on the
probability of rejection (1 ¡ ½2½1).
4 Empirical bidding model
This section presents the empirical bidding model. I describe the econometric speci¯ca-
tion, the estimation method and the construction of variables.
4.1 Price equations
To assess the e®ect of bidders' preferences and strategic behavior on prices, I assume that
awl can be approximated by a linear function such that the bidding model (2) becomes
pl = ¯zl + °1L + °2qwL + °3qwl + °4q¡wl + °5½l + °6sl + ²l; (9)
where l = 1;:::;L and L = 1;:::;96 the number of auction days. The dependent variable
pl is the logarithm of the observed winning bid bwl. The independent variables are product
is no second auction. The probability ½ 2 [0;1] is common knowledge and can be viewed as an estimate
of sellers' valuations that is known to all bidders in advance. In the second auction, bidders bid up to
their valuation ui and in the ¯rst auction, bidders bid a weighted average of their valuation ui and the
price in the second auction, the third-order statistic u[3:I]. Beggs and Graddy (1997) obtain a similar
outcome, when the order of sale is according to quality and bidders' valuations are assumed to decline
with a common factor ½ 2 [0;1].
16A detailed proof is given in Appendix B.
15characteristics z, where z also includes product-speci¯c, auction day-speci¯c and seller-
speci¯c ¯xed e®ects. Other independent variables are the arguments of the function awl
given by (4), (5) and (8). The number of o®ered units L is used to test the strategic e®ect
of sequential auctions (see equation 4). The total number of units bought by the winning
bidder on an auction day qwL, the cumulative number of units bought by the winning
bidder qwl and the cumulative number of units bought by other bidders q¡wl are used
to test for the strategic e®ect of multi-unit demand (see equation 5). The probability of
rejection ½l and the order of units sl are used to test the e®ect of the secret reserve price
(see equation 8). The number of bidders I is not known from the data. In line with the
theoretical considerations, it is assumed to be constant over an auction day. Its e®ect is
therefore not identi¯ed from the auction day-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects. ²l is the error term.
I estimate equation (9) with ordinary least squares. To account for di®erences in
bidders' preferences, I also estimate it separately for traders and farmers. To explore the
determinants of the price patterns, I decompose the price di®erence between traders and
farmers with techniques developed by Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973) and Neumark (1988).
These techniques are used in labor economics to analyze wage di®erentials and distinguish
between di®erences in human capital endowment and di®erences in the valuation of human
capital across groups of individuals. Here, these techniques help to understand whether
the di®erence in prices across bidders can be explained by di®erences in preferences or
di®erences in strategic behavior.17
4.2 Probability of rejection
To model the probability of rejection ½l, I use data on units for which the seller has
rejected the outcome of the auction. There are 1497 such observtions (see Table 1). I
estimate a probit model with an indicator variable that is equal to one for unsold cows
17A description of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is given in Appendix C.
16and equal to zero otherwise as the dependent variable. Explanatory variables are prod-
uct characteristics z, including product-speci¯c, auction day-speci¯c and seller-speci¯c
dummy variables, the number of o®ered units L, total number of units bought by the
winning bidder on an auction day qwL, cumulative number of units bought by the win-
ning bidder qwl, cumulative number of units bought by other bidders q¡wl and order of
units sl. I then construct the inverse Mill's ratio to be eventually used as an estimate for
the probability of rejection ½l in the price equations.18 As there is no obvious choice for
an exclusion restriction, the probit and price equations are only identi¯ed through the
nonlinearity of the inverse Mill's ratio.
4.3 Construction of variables
Product characteristics like breed, category and quality are transformed into dummy vari-
ables, which are equal to one, when a particular classi¯cation is met and zero otherwise.
For example, there is a dummy variable that is equal to one for Fleckvieh and zero for
Braunvieh or one that is equal to one for Quality 1B and zero else. Additionally, I con-
struct product-speci¯c dummy variables. For each product, de¯ned by the characteristics
breed, category, quality and subquality, a dummy variable is constructed that is equal to
one for the product and zero else. There are four products that account for the largest
proportion of the sample. These are Fleckvieh, female calves of quality 2B, subquality 1
(2 or 3) and Fleckvieh, female calves of quality 3A, subquality 1.
Auction days are also transformed into auction day speci¯c dummy variables. The
data include an identi¯er for sellers that allows me to follow them across auction days.
I construct personal speci¯c dummy variables for six sellers who supply more than 100
animals in the years 1995 to 2003. There are further 80 sellers who sold between 50 and
100 objects. These are summarized to one group speci¯c dummy variable.
18For a discussion on the inverse Mill's ratio see for example, Wooldridge (2001, chapter 17).
17L is the number of o®ered cows on an auction day. This variable does not vary
within auction days, but only over auction days. Its e®ect can therefore only be tested,
if there is data from a su±cient number of auction days. For each winning bidder, the
variable qwL is the total number of units bought by the winning bidder on an auction day.
For each bidder, this variables does not vary within auction days, but only over auction
days. Its e®ect can therefore only be tested, if there is enough variation across bidders.
The variable qwl is equal to the cumulative number of units bought by the winning bidder
within an auction day. It is zero for the ¯rst bought unit on each auction day, equal to
one for the second bought unit and so on. The variable q¡wl is equal to the cumulative
number of units bought by the other bidders on an auction day. The latter two variables
vary over bidders and auction days.
The order of units sl on a particular auction day is constructed as a variable that
measures the relative time elapsed on an auction day. The number of units o®ered at
various auction days di®ers. I normalize these numbers to one and construct a variable
that is equal to zero before the auction starts, that linearly increases in the course of the
auction day and is equal to one at the end of an auction day.
5 Estimation results
In this section I present the estimation results of the probit model and the hedonic price
equations. I report the results of basic and some further speci¯cations. Finally, I describe
the decomposition results.
5.1 Basic speci¯cations
Table 3 presents the estimation results. Column 1 reports the results of the probit model.
It reports the change in the probability for an in¯nitesimal change in independent, con-
tinuous variables and the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables. We ¯nd
18that the explanatory power is of 12% and that the probability of rejection signi¯cantly
depends on some but not all product characteristics and bidder's own demand. Important
product characteristics are a cow's quality and weight. A higher quality and more weight
makes it more unlikely that the cow stays unsold. The contrary is true for bidders' own
demand. The more cows a bidder has already bought, the more likely that a cow stays
unsold. The product-speci¯c, auction day-speci¯c and seller-speci¯c e®ects also have a
signi¯cant e®ect on the probability of rejection.
Columns 2-8 present the estimation results for various basic speci¯cations of the price
equation (9). Column (2) uses data on all bidders, whereas all other speci¯cations separate
between traders and farmers. The ¯rst speci¯cation (columns 2, 3 and 4) includes product
characteristics and the order of units. It constitutes that speci¯cation to which I am
going to compare the other speci¯cations. It is also the most common speci¯cation in the
literature.19 The second speci¯cation (columns 5 and 6) additionally includes the number
of o®ered units, the total number of units bought by the winning bidder on an auction
day, cumulative number of units bought by the winning bidder and cumulative number
of units bought by other bidders. This speci¯cation accounts for the strategic e®ect of
sequential auctions and bidders' multi-unit demand. The third speci¯cation (columns 7
and 8) additionally includes the inverse Mill's ratio to account for the strategic e®ect of
the secret reserve price. Product-speci¯c, auction day-speci¯c and seller-speci¯c dummy
variables are used and prove to be highly signi¯cant in all speci¯cations. To avoid a
potential misclassi¯cation of traders and farmers, I drop observations when traders bought
less than ten cows or when farmers bought more than two cows (see also Table 2). We
¯nd that the explanatory power of the conducted regressions is quite good. Between 62
and 70% of the variance in the dependent variable can be explained.
When we compare column 2 with columns 3 and 4, we observe that some of estimated
19See for example, Beggs and Graddy (1997) or Deltas and Kosmopoulou (2004).
19coe±cients are di®erent across speci¯cations. Examples are quality 2B, weight and the
order of units. To test their statistical signi¯cance, I conduct a Chow test. The F-statistic
has (116, 22148) degrees of freedom and a value of 24.29. The null hypothesis of equal
coe±cients can be rejected. This indicates the importance to distinguish between traders
and farmers in the regressions. It also indicates that bidders' preferences are di®erent.
Although there are di®erences in the estimated coe±cients, there are no di®erences in the
general perception which characteristics are worth most.
Table 3 about here
The estimated values for the constant are 5.7630 and 5.7778 for traders and between
5.9796 and 6.0501 for farmers. As the coe±cients indicate, to control for product quality
does not necessarily provide an explanation for the price di®erence between traders and
farmers. Traders pay between 20 and 30% less for a cattle with basic product characteris-
tics (Braunvieh, cow, quality 3B, subquality 3) than farmers do. To recall, the raw price
di®erential is of 12%. This might be an indication that the valuations of traders are on
average lower than those of farmers. The constant is, however, not identi¯ed from the
constant of the linear function approximating the strategic behavior.
The estimated coe±cients of the product characteristics are jointly signi¯cant in all
equations. Their signs and order of magnitude depict the same general pattern for traders
and farmers. We observe, as earlier mentioned, di®erences in the coe±cients for category,
quality 2B and weight. The di®erence in the coe±cient for young female calves might
account for di®erences in risk aversion as in contrast to female calves and cows, young
female calves do not produce milk yet and thus their quality, which is based on their
mothers' quality, is a²icted with some uncertainty. The higher coe±cient for quality 2B
in the equation for farmers, re°ects their preference for this quality. The higher coe±cient
of weight in the equation of traders mirrors their preference for cows with more weight. As
20traders prefer pregnant cows over lactating cows as the latter can not be transported long
distances, it is most likely that the higher coe±cient of weight accounts for the additional
value of the unborn calf.
The price decline over auction days observed in the raw data is mainly explained by
the behavior of farmers. Still, both groups of bidders pay declining prices over an auction
day. The extent is di®erent. Everything equal, the average price a trader (farmer) pays
for the ¯rst cow on an auction day is about 3% (13%) higher than that he or she pays
for the last cow (see columns 3 and 4). This result provides evidence that part of the raw
price decline of 17% (5% for traders and 22% for farmers) can be explained by the fact
that the order of sale is according to quality.20
When we add the number of o®ered units, the total number of units bought by the
winning bidder on an auction day, cumulative number of units bought by the winning
bidder and cumulative number of units bought by other bidders to the regression equa-
tions, the estimated coe±cients of the order of units change. It becomes a positive value
of about 1% for traders (column 5). It is, however, insigni¯cant. It decreases to signi¯cant
5% for farmers (column 6). When we add the probability of rejection to the regression
equations, the estimated coe±cients of the order of units change only slightly (columns 7
and 8). These results indicate that the estimated price decline is actually less pronounced
compared to a standard speci¯cation used in the literature, once we take the institutional
aspects of the auctions into account. For some bidders we even do not observe a price
20By normalizing the variable the order of units to be zero at the beginning and to be one at the end
of each action day, it is de¯ned to measure the relative time elapsed on an auction day. If instead, I
use a variable that measures the absolute time elapsed, i.e. the number of remaining objects, I obtain
qualitatively the same results (in absolute values only, as the two variables are de¯ned in the opposite
way). However, to be able to compare the estimated coe±cients, I calculated the elasticities evaluated
at the sample means for both variables. I obtained 1.8% and 1.8% for traders and 6.0% and 6.2% for
farmers. The ¯rst numbers are for the relative time elapsed and the second numbers are for the absolute
time elapsed on an auction day. All these numbers should be interpreted as such prices decline over an
auction day.
21decline anymore.
In turn, we observe that prices also depend on the variables that explain bidders'
strategic behavior with respect to the sequential aspect of the auctions, bidders' multi-unit
demand and the secret reserve price. The estimated coe±cient of the number of o®ered
units tests the prediction of the sequential aspect of the auctions (see equation 4). It is
insigni¯cant for traders and signi¯cantly negative for farmers. Traders do no adjust their
bids to di®erent market situations. This result also indicates that their aggregate demand
function is highly elastic. Farmers, whereas, adjust their bids in a way as is expected.
The more units are o®ered the lower the price.
The estimated coe±cients of the total number of units bought by the winning bidder
on an auction day, cumulative number of units bought by the winning bidder and cumu-
lative number of units bought by other bidders test the prediction of multi-unit demand
(see equation 5). The estimated coe±cient of the number of units bought by the winning
bidder on an auction day is signi¯cantly positive for traders and signi¯cantly negative for
farmers. The values are 0.0004 and -0.0264. The more units traders buy on an auction
day, the higher the price. A higher demand let them bid more aggressively. We observe
the opposite for farmers. The reason for this result is that there are only two groups
of farmers buying either one or two units, and therefore, there is not enough variation
in the data to identify the e®ect of this variable. The more units bidders have already
bought within an auction day, the higher the price. Bidders shade their bids and take the
strategic e®ect of multi-unit demand into account. The estimated coe±cients correspond
to a 1.0% elasticity for traders and a 0.2% elasticity for farmers (each evaluated at the
sample mean). The e®ect of bid shading { assuming it to be linear { is given but small.
This is in particular true when we compare these values to the estimated elasticities for
the cumulative number of units bought by other bidders. The more objects other bid-
ders have already bought the lower the price. The estimated coe±cients correspond to a
223.2% elasticity for traders and a 4.0% elasticity for farmers (each evaluated at the sample
mean).
The estimated coe±cient of the probability of rejection tests the prediction of the
secret reserve price (see equation 8). We expect it to be positively related with prices. If
it is signi¯cant, we also expect prices to decline over an auction day. If, however, only
the coe±cient of the order of units is signi¯cant, declining prices are not explained by the
secret reserve price but might be due to other reasons like participation cost. As columns
7 and 8 show, the estimated coe±cient of the probability of rejection is insigni¯cantly
di®erent from zero for traders and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero for farmers. Traders
do not adjust their bids to the secret reserve price, whereas farmers do. The higher the
probability that the seller rejects the outcome of the auction, the higher the prices of
farmers. In line with the predictions, the estimated price decline is at the same time
insigni¯cant for traders and signi¯cant for farmers. The joint occurrence of these results
let us believe that there is no explanation for the price decline other than the secret
reserve price. To evaluate the strength of this hypothesis, I conduct robustness checks
and estimate further speci¯cations to account for bidders' participation.
5.2 Bidders' participation
Other reasons for declining prices may be a declining participation due to the order of
sale according to quality or due to participation cost. Up to now, I have assumed that
the number of bidders I, although unknown and only jointly identi¯ed with auction
day-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects, is constant over an auction day. Cows of di®erent quality are
imperfect substitutes. If bidders' substitution patterns are di®erent, di®erent product
qualities may attract a di®erent number of bidders. The order of sale according to quality
then automatically induces a decreasing participation, as bidders who only buy higher
quality do not bid for lower quality. If there are participation cost, any order of sale
23induces a decreasing participation.21 Both e®ects would be measured by the order of
units.
I estimate further speci¯cations of the price equation. The ¯rst speci¯cation adds
the order of units multiplied with particular product groups to the speci¯cation presented
in columns 7 and 8 of Table 3. The second speci¯cation additionally includes the order
of units multiplied with the deciles in which each auction day can be divided (see also
Table 1). The ¯rst set of variables tests for di®erent participation behavior within par-
ticular product groups, whereas the second set of variables tests whether participation is
driven by particular times of an auction day. All speci¯cations are again estimated with
product-speci¯c, auction day-speci¯c and seller-speci¯c dummy variables. To support the
hypothesis that declining prices are primarily caused by the secret reserve price, we expect
the previously obtained results to sustain. The added variables are either insigni¯cant
or, if they are signi¯cant, do not not change the signs and signi¯cance of the variables
that describe bidders' strategic behavior with respect to the secret reserve price, i.e. the
probability of rejection and order of units.
Table 4 presents the estimation results. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of the
extended probit models. Columns 3-8 present the results of the extended price equations
for all bidders, traders and farmers. We ¯nd that the explanatory power of the regressions
does not improve anymore. Columns 3 and 4 present the results for all bidders. They are
depicted for comparison reasons only. I also conduct Chow tests and can reject the null
hypotheses of equal coe±cients for both speci¯cations.
Table 4 about here
Columns 5 and 6 present the results when we add the order of units multiplied with
21For explicit models with participation cost see for example, von der Fehr (1994) or Menezes and
Monteiro (1997). For structural models that account for bidders' participation see Bajari and Hortacsu
(2003), Donald, Paarsch and Robert (2006) or Song (2004).
24particular product groups for traders and farmers. We observe a larger than previously
estimated price decline over the auction day and signi¯cant price movements for each
product group. The overall price decline is of about 6.0%, although still insigni¯cant, for
traders and 26.2% for farmers, whereas the price decline for the product group \Braun-
vieh" is stronger and the price decline for the product group Fleckvieh, female calves,
quality 2B, sub-quality 2 is weaker than the overall decline. The estimated coe±cient of
the inverse Mill's ratio is insigni¯cant for traders and it is signi¯cant for farmers.
Columns 7 and 8 present the last speci¯cation for traders and farmers. The estimated
coe±cients of the order of units multiplied with ten intervals in which each auction day
can be divided are jointly signi¯cant for traders, but none of the coe±cient is individually
signi¯cant. The estimated coe±cients are jointly and individually insigni¯cant for farmers.
The estimation results of the speci¯cations that take the bidders' participation be-
havior into account support the hypothesis that declining prices are mainly caused by the
secret reserve price. For both further speci¯cations, we observe an insigni¯cant probabil-
ity of rejection combined with an insigni¯cant price decline for traders and a signi¯cant
probability of rejection combined with a signi¯cant price decline for farmers. The added
variables do not change the previously obtained results. The results, however, further
show that di®erent product groups attract di®erent numbers of bidders.
5.3 Decomposition results
To evaluate the price di®erence between traders and farmers, I employ decomposition
techniques. There are three sources that may explain this di®erence: bidders' prefer-
ences for particular products, strategic behavior and participation. Bidders' preferences
are measured by product characteristics, product-speci¯c and seller-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects.
Strategic behavior is measured by the number of o®ered units, total number of units
bought by the winning bidder, cumulative number of units bought by the winning bidder,
25cumulative number of units bought by other bidders and order of units. Participation
behavior is measured by the order of units multiplied with particular product groups and
order of units multiplied with the deciles in which each auction day can be divided.
Table 5 presents the decomposition results. The basic results are obtained using
the speci¯cations presented in columns 7 and 8 in Table 3, but without the variable the
number of units bought by the winning bidder on an auction day. I leave out this variable
as it does not measures the same for traders and farmers (see section 5.1). I calculate the
decomposition results for three additional speci¯cations. The ¯rst of these speci¯cations
drops the variables that describe bidders' preferences; the second drops the variables that
describe strategic behavior; and the third adds the variables that describes participation
behavior. In all speci¯cations, the distribution of reference is the distribution of all bids.
The (logarithmic) price di®erence between traders and farmers is equal to 0.129.
The decomposition results of the basic speci¯cation show that the unexplained part of
the price di®erence is equal to 0.034 (27.3%) and the explained part of the price di®erence
is equal to 0.091 (72.7%). About three quarters third of the raw price di®erence can be
attributed to bidders' endowment, i.e. which product qualities bidders go for. The other
part is due to di®erences in coe±cients that may re°ect di®erences in the willingness to
pay, strategic behavior or participation.
Table 5 about here
The results for the other speci¯cations show that bidders' preferences are the most
important source of the unexplained price di®erence between traders and farmers. Bid-
ders' strategic behavior is the second most important source, whereas a contribution of
variables that describe bidders' participation is not given.
Particular variables that contribute most to the unexplained price di®erence between
traders and farmers are quality 2B, weight, the number of o®ered units, cumulative number
26of units bought by the winning bidder, order of units and the inverse Mill's ratio. These
results indicate that di®erences in strategic behavior are mainly driven by di®erences in
the reaction to supply and uncertainty of supply.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
I presented an empirical analysis of bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions. The
objectives were to investigate the role of institutional speci¯cs as determinants of prices.
Institutional speci¯cs are the order of sale according to quality, a secret reserve price,
bidders' multi-unit demand and the existence of two bidder groups, i.e. traders and
farmers. Prices decline over auction days and bidders with a higher demand pay on
average lower prices.
I discussed various bidding models and their predictions on prices. I showed that a
secret reserve price in sequential auctions is equivalent to uncertainty about the number
of o®ered units and that prices are expected to decline. If bidders demand more than
one unit, prices are expected to increase (Donald, Paarsch and Roberts 2006). I then
estimated reduced form price equations and employed decomposition techniques to ¯nd
out, whether the decline in prices is caused by the order of sale according to quality or
the secret reserve price. Further questions were, whether bidders consider the strategic
e®ects generated by the sequential auctions and multi-unit demand, and whether the price
di®erence between traders and farmers is caused by di®erences in bidders' preferences or
di®erences in strategic behavior. For the analysis, I utilized a large data set on cattle
auctions that covers 95 auction days from 1995 till 2003 with more than 25,000 dairy
cows o®ered.
The main estimation results are summarized as follows. Product characteristics are
the most important source of variation in prices. This is not astonishing given that a cow's
quality determines its (known) common value on the market. Nevertheless, institutional
27aspects and their e®ect on bidders' strategic behavior are non-negligible determinants
of prices. Declining prices are caused by the order of sale according to quality and the
secret reserve price. This is evidence in line with Beggs and Graddy (1997) and Deltas and
Kosmopoulou (2004), who can also explain observed price patterns by speci¯c institutions.
Further, bidders take the strategic e®ects of sequential auctions and multi-unit demand
into account and shade their bids for earlier units.
The price di®erence between traders and farmers is mainly explained by di®erences
in preferences and only to a lesser extent by di®erences in strategic behavior. Traders are
in general more insensitive to institutional aspects. They strategically react to sequential
auctions and multi-unit demand, but do not adjust their bids to the secret reserve price.
Their prices are on average constant over auction days and their aggregate demand is
highly elastic { a result in line with treasury auctions, where the aggregate demand of
internationally acting banks is also highly elastic (Nyborg, Rydqvist and Sundaresan 2002,
and Elsinger and Zulehner 2007). Farmers react to all institutional aspects, in particular
to supply and to the uncertainty of supply generated by the secret reserve price. This
re°ects the di®erence of these two groups. Traders regularly attend auctions not only
in Amstetten but also in other places. Farmers most likely have to rely on the auction
market in Amstetten and rationally react to supply in this market.
Institutional aspects may have opposite e®ects on prices in sequential auctions. If
the empirical analysis does not or due to lack of data cannot take all aspects into account,
the evidence of some strategic behavior might be buried under a general price decline.
Once we take all aspects into account, the empirical evidence might be in accordance to
the predictions of the theoretical models.
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32A Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics for prices (winning bids)
Number of Standard
Variable observations Mean error Minimum Maximum
Winning bid in Euro 27,183 1275.20 271.1 85.2 4798.2
Outcomes
Objects sold in the auction 25,036 1296.00 263.4 427.9 4798.2
Objects sold after the auction 89 1380.46 323.4 753.0 2695.8
Seller did not accept the price 1,497 1064.79 222.8 239.9 3125.0
Initial o®er was not accepted 561 891.97 174.3 85.2 3088.1
Bidders
Representatives of wholesale ¯rms 8,982 1196.72 209.7 427.9 3215.3
Farmers from nearby regions 16,143 1351.70 274.2 498.3 4798.2
Breed
Braunvieh 3,034 1223.13 248.8 237.4 2121.1
Fleckvieh 24,149 1281.75 273.1 85.2 4798.2
Category
Female Calves 26,563 1283.98 265.1 85.2 4798.2
Young Female Calves 338 762.55 123.3 427.9 1053.0
Cows 282 1062.88 281.9 589.6 2379.7
Quality
Quality 1B 505 1844.19 303.6 1203.7 4798.2
Quality 2A 782 1632.76 258.7 710.4 2379.7
Quality 2B 20,341 1304.30 235.1 85.2 3215.3
Quality 3A 5,141 1080.75 207.4 242.0 2203.9
Quality 3B 414 890.77 206.3 427.9 1530.7
Subquality 1 14,523 1326.16 299.2 242.0 4798.2
Subquality 2 9,758 1236.88 221.0 85.2 3125.0
Subquality 3 2,902 1149.05 206.2 498.3 2207.6
Most often o®ered product groups
Fleckvieh, female calves, quality 2B 17899 1315.26 234.2 85.2 3215.3
Fleckvieh, female calves, quality 3A 4402 1100.44 201.6 242.0 2203.9
Order of sale
Decile 1 (Morning) 2,665 1263.48 271.3 434.7 4798.2
Decile 2 2,712 1347.22 389.0 237.4 4022.0
Decile 3 2,723 1426.74 247.6 443.1 3125.0
Decile 4 2,713 1437.05 218.8 242.0 2695.8
Decile 5 2,758 1372.54 230.3 242.0 2402.7
Decile 6 2,680 1299.99 203.3 596.7 3125.0
Decile 7 2,737 1255.59 200.6 241.3 2207.6
Decile 8 2,699 1192.27 202.2 85.2 3125.0
Decile 9 2,736 1106.64 188.2 242.0 1948.5
Decile 10 (Afternoon) 2,760 1053.47 201.5 242.0 2203.9
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the winning bids. Prices are in constant Euros as of 1996. Prices
before the introduction of the Euro are divided by 13.7603, which was the reference value for the Austrian
Schilling in the Euro currency board.
33Table 2: Demand schedules
Number of units Number of bidders Mean price in Euro
bought on one auction day All Traders Farmers All Traders Farmers
1-10 15,811 465 15,346 1352.1 1118.9 1359.2
1 9,910 9,888 1378.0 1378.7
2 3,882 3,860 1338.0 1339.8
11-20 1,612 1,346 266 1213.0 1214.1 1207.7
21-30 3,462 2,964 498 1198.0 1195.8 1211.2
31-40 2,645 2,612 33 1191.9 1192.4 1154.3
41-50 679 679 1199.9 1199.9
51-60 327 327 1240.5 1240.5
61-100 589 589 1214.5 1214.5
Total 25,125 8,982 16,143 1296.3 1196.7 1351.7
Table 2 presents the demand schedules of all bidders, traders and farmers. For each bidder group, the
number of units bought and the mean prices is given in frequency intervals. Prices are in constant Euros
as of 1996. Prices before the introduction of the Euro are divided by 13.7603, which was the reference





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 5: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results
Price di®erence Total Unexplained Explained
Distribution of reference: all bids
Basic speci¯cation 0.129 0.034 0.091
27.3% 72.7%
Additional speci¯cations
Without variables that describe product characteristics 0.129 0.077 0.048
61.5% 38.5%
Without variables that describe strategic behavior 0.129 0.037 0.087
29.8% 70.2%
With variables that describe participation behavior 0.129 0.034 0.090
27.6% 72.4%
Contribution of selected variables
Quality 2B 0.118 0.043
Weight -0.423 -0.016
Order of units -0.027 0.005
Number of o®ered units -0.451 0.032
Number of bought units -0.101 0.010
Inverse Mill's ratio 0.677 -0.005
Table 5 presents decomposition results based on separate price regressions for traders and farmers. The
distribution of reference is the distribution of all bids. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the
winning bid. The explanatory variables of the basic speci¯cation are a constant, product characteristics,
the order of units, total number of units bought by winning bidder, cumulative number of units bought
by winning bidder and cumulative number of units bought by other bidders, product-speci¯c, auction
day-speci¯c and seller-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects. The variables that describe bidders' preferences are product
characteristics, product-speci¯c and seller-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects. The variables that describe the strategic
behavior are the order of units, the number of bought units, the number of units bought by other bidders
and the number of o®ered units. Variables that describe the participation behavior are the order of units
multiplied with particular product groups and the order of units multiplied with the deciles in which each
auction day can be divided. The reference group with respect to product characteristics is Braunvieh,
cows, quality 3B and subquality 3.
41B Appendix: Proposition and proof
Proposition 1. Suppose the outcomes of the ¯rst and the second auction are not rejected
by the respective sellers and both units are sold, then the price of the second unit is expected
to be lower than the price of the ¯rst unit, i.e. E[P2jp1] < p1.
Proof. The expected price P2 in the second auction given that both units are sold
is equal to
E[P2jp1] = E[b2(u[3])jb1(u[2]) = p1] = E[u[3]jb
¡1
1 (p1) = u[2]]: (10)





p1 ¡ (1 ¡ ½2)b
¡1
1 (p1) ¡ ½2(1 ¡ ½1)E[u[2]jb
¡1
1 (p1) = u[1]]
½1½2
; (11)
and we notice that
p1 ¡ ½1½2fp1 ¡ E[u[2]jb
¡1
1 (p1) = u[1]]g < b
¡1
1 (p1) ¡ ½2fb
¡1
1 (p1) ¡ E[u[2]jb
¡1
1 (p1) = u[1]]g (12)
is true as p1 > b1(p1) and E[u[2]jb
¡1
1 (p1) = u[1]] > p1. Therefore, E[P2jp1] < p1 as asserted.
2
42C Appendix: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions are usually used in labor economics to analyze wage dif-
ferentials across sex and/or race. With the help of these techniques one can divide the
raw wage di®erential in an explained and an unexplained part. The ¯rst is due to di®er-
ences in the endowment of human capital and other explanatory variables. The second
part is due di®erences in coe±cients and in labor economics often denoted discrimina-
tion. When applying this method to price di®erences in auctions, the di®erence in the
endowment re°ects a di®erence in preferences. For example, which qualities bidders go
for. The unexplained part mirrors a di®erence in coe±cients. Controlling for preferences,
i.e. product characteristics, di®erences in coe±cients may be perceived as a di®erence in
strategic behavior or relative demand.
There are two groups of individuals, i = 1;2. For each group a regression equation
is estimated by ordinary least squares:
Yi = Xi µi + ui;i = 1;2;
with Yi to be logarithmic price of object i and Xi to be the respective explanatory vari-
ables. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition uses the property of the ordinary least square
estimator ^ µi, that the means of observations Y i and Xi lie on the regression plane:
Y i = Xi ^ µi; i = 1;2:
The mean di®erence in the dependent variable can then be decomposed into two weighted
di®erences:
(Y 1 ¡ Y 2) = (X1 ¡ X2) ^ µ1 + X2(^ µ1 ¡ ^ µ2):
It is a weighted sum of di®erences in explanatory variables and of di®erences in coe±cients.
The ¯rst di®erence is called the explained part. The second one is called the unexplained
part. The reference distribution is the distribution of the ¯rst group. This decomposition
43is not unique, as there is an index problem. Another form is to weight the above described
di®erences with the regression coe±cient of the second group and the mean vector of
explanatory variables of the ¯rst group, respectively:
(Y 1 ¡ Y 2) = (X1 ¡ X2) ^ µ2 + X1(^ µ1 ¡ ^ µ2):
The reference distribution is the distribution of the second group. There are also other
forms of decomposition using other distributions as the reference distribution like the
overall population mean.
44